The recent announcement that the National Citizen Service (NCS) would be wound down from March 2025 (Simpson, 2024) was not an unexpected one for many of us who work in England’s youth work sector. However, the speed in which it would be decommissioned was a surprise and it has left many of us wondering if the new Labour government plans to prioritise youth work in any sort of meaningful way moving forward. For a sector that has been so diminished over the last 15 years, there is growing anxiety among those of us on the frontline about what is—or, more importantly, is not—coming down the road, amid the often smoke-and-mirrors nature of government rhetoric. This article will reflect on the creation and evolution of NCS and its impact on the youth sector, and it will assess the short-term prospects for youth work in England in light of its demise. It will also demonstrate that the commitments to youth work announced by government so far are not quite as positive as they might first appear – and will provide suggestions in regards to what is required to rebuild a sector which has been steadily declining for more than a decade.

NCS was established in 2009 under the Conservative – Liberal Democrat coalition government with pilot programmes announced for 10,000 school leavers in 2011 (Cabinet Office and Cameron, 2010). The programme was aligned to Prime Minister David Cameron’s vision of a ‘Big Society’ and focused on community cohesion and social action for 16- and 17-year olds and was delivered using a prescriptive model which consisted of several phases, including a residential element away from home. The programme was expensive and by the time the NCS Act 2017 was given royal assent, government had committed £1.5bn in funding between 2011 and 2020 (Ricketts, 2017). During a period when spending on local youth services was declining at an alarming rate, representing a 73% cut by 2021 (National Youth Agency and YMCA, 2021), many in the youth sector despaired at the public money being poured into a very time-limited programme for only a small portion of young people.

The cost of the programme was not its only criticism. Large contracts to run the programme were announced, with one particularly controversial consortium being fronted by Serco, a private contractor, which raised concerns about private sector creep into the youth sector (Levitt, 2012). In 2017, concerns were also raised about how the structure of the programme would impact on the professional status of youth work due to the short term and precarious nature of the employment contracts offered to those on the front-line (de St Croix, 2017). This was also coupled with the employment of individuals external to the youth sector, including teachers, further blurring the lines between the formal nature of schools and the informal approach of youth work.

In more recent years, the budget for NCS has been steadily reduced by central government and this has changed the format of the programme substantially. The Public Accounts Committee (2017) published a report which questioned aspects relating to the governance arrangements of the NCS Trust, the long-term impact of the programme on young people and the programme’s value for money. Government spending on the programme was later reduced from 90% of all allocated central government spend for youth to just 30% of the total in 2022 (Cohen, 2022) and the programme was cut from £158.6m to £50.3m in 2023 (Legraien, 2023). A new approach to delivery was subsequently announced (NCS, 2023) with more community-based activities commissioned with youth sector providers and the launch of a digital offer for young people.

This new delivery model for NCS makes the sudden closure of the programme and the Trust perhaps more complex than it would have been a decade ago. The more recent community-based funding arrangements mean that around 250 youth organisations will not have their funding from NCS renewed next April (Diggle, 2024). I know, from speaking with colleagues who are being funded under this arrangement, that it will delete important income off the balance sheet of some, and for others there is a risk that entire streams of their work will disappear along with the infrastructure which NCS has developed over the last 15 years. There does not appear to be any indication to date that the money saved by cutting NCS will be reallocated back into youth provision, which is particularly concerning at a time when funding for the sector continues to be significantly challenging.

The 2025/2026 financial year is projected to be a particularly difficult one for youth work and the wider voluntary and community sector. There has been a significant rise in costs over the last several years and a growing number of foundations and trusts have paused their programmes, with many citing unprecedented demand as the reason (Zhang, 2024). The announcement of changes to employer National Insurance contributions in Labour’s first autumn budget is set to be significant. In my region alone, the North East, the estimated cost to the charity sector indicates that an additional £19.5m will need to be found next financial year (VONNE, 2024). This, coupled with the results of a recent survey conducted by the North East Youth Alliance (Lockyer Turnbull, 2024), which I suspect will be mirrored elsewhere in the country, also shows that:

• 67% of youth organisations that responded are predicting a shortfall in their funding;
• 57% anticipate they will need to close or reduce services;
• 26% state that they have no reserves to fall back on.

So, what next for the 250 organisations who will be impacted by the closure of NCS and indeed the wider youth sector? In short, we are still not sure and early signs are mixed. The more concrete announcements made so far about investment in young people and youth work by the new government appear to be focussed on fixing the outcomes of more than a decade of cuts in services to young people, rather than also investing to fix the root causes. The Youth Futures programme (The Labour Party, 2024) will initiate a range of interventions aimed at reducing knife crime and addressing mental health issues amongst young people. There has also been an announcement about a Youth Guarantee which will provide access to an apprenticeship, other training, or support to find a job for 18-21-year olds (Department for Work and Pensions, HM Treasury and Department for Education, 2024). References to universal open access youth work provision have been minimal aside from a brief reference in the Youth Futures announcement which cites the delivery of such an approach ‘where appropriate’ alongside a range of other specified targeted interventions.

The government’s announcement of its intention to create a National Youth Strategy (Department for Media, Culture and Sport, Peacock and Nandy, 2024) could be a positive step forward but the final plan needs to be multifaceted and appropriately resourced. A commitment to co-produce the strategy with young people is certainly a positive intention, as is a recognition of the importance of community-based youth services. There is a commitment that the strategy will help to rebuild a ‘thriving and sustainable sector’ which is sorely needed to restore a workforce that has been significantly reduced during the last decade (Local Government Association, 2024). The National Youth Agency (2025) has recently launched a consultation on a transformation of the youth work qualifications framework in preparedness for the new Youth Strategy, and in recognition that the number of professionally recognised training programmes have dropped from 37 to 6 in a little over a decade. Those courses that do remain are under real threat, with only 96 combined undergraduate and postgraduate students and 131 level 6 apprentices enrolling across England in 2024. Proposed changes to the framework include shorter duration apprenticeships and programmes, the introduction of a Higher National Diploma and enhanced recognition of prior learning. The results of the consultation are due to be published this spring. However, there will be no quick fix to what has been a significant decline in the numbers of individuals accessing professional level courses due to the precarious and low paid nature of many of the jobs available.

Strategies need to be appropriately resourced if they are to be successful and the initial signs do not seem particularly positive or ambitious. £100m has been committed as an initial investment over four years from the Dormant Assets Scheme, which reallocates funds from dormant bank accounts to charities and social enterprises, along with a further £85m commitment from government (Department for Media, Culture and Sport, Peacock and Nandy, 2024). These figures, on the face of it, do not scream ambitious commitment to rebuild the sector and, if we dig deeper, the situation is even more concerning. Investment in ‘youth’ was already identified as a commitment by the previous Conservative government after a process of consultation was carried out on what the next phase of the Dormant Assets Scheme should fund (Department for Media, Culture and Sport, 2023). This essentially means that this is not new investment at all and still only equates to £25m per year, a modest figure in light of the billions lost from the sector in recent years. The additional commitment of £85m is ringfenced for ‘youth facilities’ with £26m of it being allocated to equipment and renovations for existing youth clubs (Department for Media, Culture and Sport, Peacock and Nandy, 2024). This comes on the back of the over £300m Youth Investment Fund introduced by the last government which saw the building of new facilities and refurbishment of existing ones (Youth Investment Fund, 2024) and which begs the question: where is the revenue funding coming from to staff these facilities?

At present, there is a real risk that more youth work jobs will be lost in the coming year if additional revenue funding is not allocated. This will exacerbate an already challenging situation for a sector which has already lost so much experience over the last 15 years and will undoubtedly lead to a reduction in provision for young people which is already threadbare in many areas. As previously highlighted, the government aims to rebuild a ‘thriving and sustainable sector’ but there is little sign of that in this initial funding allocation. The loss of NCS appears to be just that; the loss of a programme which young people were benefitting from in their communities and which does not appear to be being replaced with anything like it – at least for now.

The funding landscape for youth work is bleak in the short term. There is little doubt that a good quality national Youth Strategy is needed but government should not wait to invest in the sector in the meantime. We need to be able to maintain the little that we have, otherwise there might not be much of a sector left to sustain and develop. In light of what has been outlined in this article, and through discussions with colleagues on the ground, I believe the following actions are required to secure the future of youth work during this pivotal but also precarious time:

• The funding saved from the loss of NCS (as a minimum) should be reallocated to support the sector to maintain existing services and staffing levels during the transition period whilst the Youth Strategy is being developed;
• A long-term strategy for youth work should be published which includes an investment plan which is ambitious, provides a level of financial security for the rest of this Parliament and which will meaningfully reduce the impact of more than £1 billion worth of cuts to the sector seen since 2010;
• Significant funding for youth work training should be allocated to ensure the sector is able to appropriately respond to the needs identified in the Youth Strategy. In order to restore the 4,500 youth workers who have left the sector since 2010, substantial investment is required at all levels of the qualifications framework and should also include financial support for organisations who recruit apprentices.